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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(the Convention) and its application to First Nations children. 
Specifically, it will address the issue of whether or not it is an 
appropriate and effective instrument with which to protect and 
promote the rights of First Nations children.
The situation of First Nations children in Canada will be 
examined in advance of a critique of the Convention to convey the 
need for the protection of First Nations children. Undermined by 
the state and society, can First Nations children rely on 
international legal recourse to secure a healthy and harmonious 
environment in which to grow?
To determine the answer, this analysis will examine the 
origins, the universality and the plurality of legal codes in 
international law. An éinalysis of these three dimensions suggests 
a rigidity in international law and the Convention with respect to 
whose rights it promotes and protects. I will examine the Sandra 
Lovelace Case to determine the practical implications of the 
Convention on First Nations children. The conclusion suggests that 
the "best interest of the child" is predetermined by underlying 
legal assumptions.
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NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
While the term First Nations generally refers to Status 
(registered) Indians, I have chosen to use it to refer to the 
original peoples of Canada, Indian (Status/non-Status), Inuit and 
Metis. While the specific case of the Inuit and Metis has not been 
studied for this discussion, in including them I acknowledge the 
common experiences of all First peoples with respect to their 
subjugation by the government and society.
The terms Aboriginals, Indians, Natives are used 
interchangeably depending on the works to which they refer, or to 
the time period in which they were popularly identified as such. 
The term Indigenous is commonly used globally and I have used this 
terra when referring to the international arena.
I also acknowledge that these various terms are contested both 
by the First Nations communities and Canadian society at large.
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION
According to the United Nations Children's Fund's (UNICEF)
I
I state of the World's Children (1993), 40,000 children^ die each day 
i and millions more live in poverty, disease and especially difficult 
circumstances. Some children are more vulnerable than others to 
circumstances which deprive them of a healthy childhood. In 
Canada, this is particularly true of the First Nations communities.
Six percent of Canada's children - approximately 350,000 - are 
First Nations children.% Despite Canada's high socio-economic 
I standing among industrialized countries and the liberal democratic
I system espoused by Canadians, First Nations children continue to
1
j remain, as they have for centuries, at the bottom of western
I
j hierarchy in all aspects of society.
I
Juxtaposed with the plight of First Nations children is a 
global portrait of concerned citizens at the World Summit for
u^nder united Nations terminology, children are those 18 years of age and
under.
^Denise Avard and Louise Hanvey, eds. The Health of Canada s children: A 
CICH Profile. 2d ed. (Ottawa: Canadian Institute of Child Health, 1994), 133.
2Children held in 1989, hosted by then Prime Minister Briem Mulroney 
of Canada and President Moussa Traoré of Mali. It was the largest 
j summit in the history of the United Nations (UN) to that point.
' Over 70 heads of state gathered formally to embody the rights of 
i children in international law. The resultant United Nations 
I Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter referred to as the 
Convention) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989,
I enforced as international law in 1990 and ratified by the Canadian 
 ^ government in December 1991.
I The international community, through the Convention,
I
acknowledges the vulnerability of children and the importance of 
protecting and promoting the welfare of children. Canada, in 
ratifying the Convention, agreed to a mutual commitment of 
countries to meet specific standards for the treatment of children 
within their own borders." Given the expectation that the 
international human rights regime is in place to protect individual 
human rights, this thesis will explore, from a First Nations 
perspective, ^ the notion that the Convention is an instrument to be
'Canadian UNICEF Committee. The Convention on Children's Rights; A summary 
(Toronto: Canadian UNICEF Committee, 1995), (pamphlet) inside pemel.
*In this analysis, I do not purport to speak for First Nations children. 
Rather, I will examine the Convention from the standpoint of the historical and 
material oppression of the First peoples of Canada by the government and society.
3used to protect and promote the rights of children. It will seek 
to address the question: Is the Convention an appropriate and
I effective instrument with which to protect and promote the rights
I
! of First Nations children?
At first glance, the Convention represents a commendable 
effort by nation-states to redress the imbalances and injustices 
against children; this is especially crucial because children 
cannot speak for themselves. However, despite the proliferation of 
international human rights treaties, there is a vast discrepancy 
! between international human rights theory and practice, as 
I evidenced by human rights abuses in all comers of the world.
I Legal discourse, particularly the conferring of rights, is
i
empowering to many. But whom does it empower? Does the Convention 
empower First Nations children and create an area of dignity, a 
space they so greatly need?
Legal discourse is exceptional in the sense that, unlike other 
social and political discourses which allow for various sites of 
authority, in law there is only one site: on the side of the law. 
Individuals and collectives, organizations and governments are 
expected to stay within the law. However, staying within the law 
has often had deleterious effects on the most vulnerable groups in 
society, and particularly First Nations children.
In Canada, access to the courts by First Nations communities, 
as in Delgamuukw v. the Queen (aboriginal rights), Attorney-General 
of Canada v. Lavell and Isaac et. al. v. Bedard (sexual equality) , 
and Racine v. Woods (child adoption), has illustrated competing 
discourses. However, the more important issue is the power of the 
dominant legal discourse to define and prescribe identity. 
Subsequently, the social, economic and political requirements of 
such an identity are determined by legal discourse.
In Delaamuukw v. the Queen. Justice McEachem of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia ruled that First Nations had no
aboriginal rights by discounting the identity of the Gitksan
Westsuwet'en, as presented by them through oral histories and
traditions and ethnographies. In Attorney-General of Canada v.
Lavell and Isaac et al. v. Bedard, sexual discrimination in the
Indian Act (1951) was elided by a judgment that the Indian Act
superceded the Canadian Bill of Human Rights. In Racine vs. Woods
(1983), Justice Wilson stated:
It has nothing to do with race, absolutely
nothing to do with ethnic background. It's
two women eind a little girl and one of them
doesn't know her. It's as simple as that;
all the rest of it is extra and of no consequence ...®
SRacine v. Woods, [1983] 1 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) , as quoted in Samuel 
Bull, "The Special Case of the Native Child," The Advocate 47, 4 (1989), 526.
5Similarly, access to the international legal system has been 
frustrating, if not futile, for First Nations. In Ominayak. the 
Lubicon Cree challenged the encroachment of oil exploration 
companies in Northern Alberta. In the Mikmaq. Mikmaq communities 
requested a separate seat in the Ministers' Conferences on 
Aboriginal Constitutional Matters.® In both cases, these First 
Nations groups attempted to exercise their right through an 
Optional Protocol? and invoked Article 1 (right of self- 
determination) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
RightsJ In the former, the ruling stated that the oil exploration 
companies were impacting on the cultural survival of the Lubicon 
Cree, not on their rights of self-determination.® In the latter. 
Aboriginal participation in the Conferences were left up to the 
Canadian government. In both cases, the Commission stated that the 
right of indigenous peoples to self-determination "was not within
‘Douglas Sanders, excerpt from "Developing a Modem International Law on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, a report for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, December, 1994," in Smders, "International Human Rights Law, Spring 
1996," [Course Material] Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver, A-B-5.
A^n Optional Protocol allows individuals to take cases to the International 
Human Rights Committee for adjudication, after the exhaustion of reasonable 
domestic remedies, in Sanders, A-B-3.
‘Ratified by Canada in 1976.
‘Sanders, A-B-5.
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I the competence of the Humêui Rights Committee to express views on
i
I the subject.As Douglas Sanders observed, the results were 
j inconclusive and the Committee failed to appreciate the complexity
I  of the situation. As a result,
j
I the lengthy "views" of the Committee
recount the positions of the two sides, 
without concrete conclusions, except for 
suggesting that the cultural life of the 
Lubicon Cree has been endangered.
It would seem that what is true within the boundaries of the
I state is also true in the international arena with respect to legal
I discourse. This then leads us to the Convention, and to the
I
question, does the reification of the nation-state as "parens
patriae," as protector and promotor of the rights of the child 
through a 'binding' treaty such as the Convention, safeguard the 
rights of a First Nations child to a secure and healthy childhood?
In seeking answers, I will contextualize the aim of this 
analysis by demonstrating the urgency of the situation of First 
Nations children and the need for their care and protection. In 
1989, Patricia Monture observed that "the situation of First 
Nations children was cited as the single greatest problem
“Séuiders, A-B-5. 
"Sanders, A-B-6.
7confronting the child welfare system in Canada in the 1 9 8 0 s . T o  
this end, chapter two will comprise of a compilation of statistics 
pertaining to First Nations children which demonstrate their 
abysmal status in Canadian society. The plight of First Nations 
children will also be discussed in its historical context, situated 
as it is within the colonial history of First Nations in Canada. 
Further, a discussion on the Convention, its provisions and general 
principles is necessary to illustrate the comprehensive standard to 
which all children are entitled. A brief summary of the history 
and the content of the Convention will be discussed with specific 
reference to Articles pertaining to indigenous peoples.
In chapter three I will focus on an analysis of the
international human rights discourse, beginning with the premise
stated by Peter Goodrich:
As a totality of discourses and practices, 
the legal institution continuously strives 
to present the legal code as the symbolic 
representation of an ideal sociality, as a 
way of life and as the fundamental morality 
of belonging to the social whole.“
^^Patricia Monture, "A Vicious Circle: Child Welfare ouad the First
Nations," Canadian Journal of Welfare Laws 3, 1 (1989): 8.
-Pecer Goodrich, Reading the Law: A Critical Introduction to Legal Method 
and Technique (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1986), 217-218.
8To appreciate Goodrich's argument, it is necessary to examine 
the source of the international human rights discourse. I suggest 
that the origins of international law, its construction of 
universality and legal pluralism frame the discourse ; that is, they 
define whose rights are protected and promoted. International 
human rights law spoken in the manner of western liberal 
jurisprudence, establishes strict parameters and elicits competing 
discourses, often to the detriment of those in need of protection. 
As Zygmunt Bauman argues, "one thing that liberalism cannot cater 
for is precisely the matter of justice, social justice."
To substantiate this argument, I will examine the Sandra 
Lovelace Case. a  case that was instrumental in the government's 
amendment of the Indian Act in 1985. However, the International 
Human Rights Commission's decision that Canada was in breach of 
Lovelace's right to belong to an ethnic minority, rather than sex 
discrimination in the Indian Act (a violation of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights), is testimony to the fact that 
international human rights laws can deny one's birthright to 
equality despite the system's objective otherwise. Lovelace, who
“Sandra Lovelace, a Haliseet from Tobique Reserve, New Brunswick, filed 
an application with the International Human Rights Commission in 1977, claiming 
that loss of Status as a result of marriage to a non-Indian under the Indian Act 
was discriminatory.
9resides furthest from the halls of power as an indigenous person 
and a woman, was denied her birthright of equality which the 
international human rights system claims to protect universally.
Chapter four will critique the Convention, identifying issues 
directly pertinent to First Nations children and using the Lovelace 
case to conceptualize what the Convention means to First Nations 
children. Are the rights embodied in the Convention inalienable to 
First Nations children? Cynthia Price Cohen observes that "the 
linguistic interpretation of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child is integral to its emerging jurisprudence."^® This section 
therefore will examine the practical implications of the Convention 
on First Nations children.
Arthur Dyck argues that "human rights can and must be 
reconceptualized in a way that clarifies, rather than obscures, how 
we come to know and actualize them." This study is an attempt to 
conceptualize the meaning of rights of those who cannot speak for 
themselves, and of those who remain in the margins of the dominant 
social order. It is important to challenge the Convention - "to 
ask it new questions cuid hold it up to new contexts" - in order to
'^Cynthia Price Cohen, "Rights of the Child," St. Thomas Law Review S, 1 
(1993), 5.
'^ Arthur J. Dyck, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: The Moral Bonds 
of Community (Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1994), 11.
10
reconstitute symbolic meanings of rights, of children, of 
ethnicity, in the most positive and harmonious way, to ensure a 
healthy future for First Nations children for seven generations.
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Chapter Two 
The Historical Context
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, I will 
demonstrate the need for care and protection of First Nations 
children by examining their status in Canadian society, and by 
providing an explanation of their status within the historical 
context of First Nations/non-First Nations relations. Second, I 
will examine the Convention, an instrument for the protection of 
children from neglect and abuse. Its origins, guiding principles 
and specific references to indigenous peoples. These objectives 
provide necessary information in advance of a critique and make it 
possible to appreciate fully the issues that limit the Convention 
from protecting and promoting the rights of First Nations children.
First Mations Children
According to the 1991 census, there are 1.1 million self­
identified First Nations^ '' peoples in Canada, of whom 361,670 are
''Status, Non-Status, Metis and Inuit.
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children below fifteen years of age. This represents 37% of the 
total First Nations population. Non-First Nations children under 
15 years comprise 21% of the total non-First Nations population. 
First Nations children comprise 6.4% of all children in Canada. 
The birth rate for Indian and Inuit women is twice that of the 
overall non-First Nations female population. Five percent of the 
First Nations population is 55 years and older, as compared to 21% 
of the Canadian population, figures which support the observation 
that "while the bulk of the Canadian population is aging into 
retirement years, the majority of the Aboriginal population is 
aging into reproductive years .Wh ile  the birth of children is 
the regeneration of nations, it is important to examine the 
environment to which they are born and the future that they hold.
First Nations children are the most disadvantaged children in 
Canada. Consider the evidence:
• Canada's infant mortality rate (IMR), a popular indicator used 
to assess a country's developmental progress, is one of the 
lowest among industrialized countries : an average rate of 7.3 
per thousand live births from 1986-1990. The IMR for Status 
Indian babies during the same years, however, was appallingly
"All statistics in this paragraph from Avard and Hanvey, eds. The Health 
of Canada's Children. 131-135.
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high, almost twice the total Canadian rate and similar to the
Canadian rate of the 1960s. The rate was even higher for
Inuit babies, as shown in Table I. Post neonatal (28 days to
1 year) deaths from 1984-1988 were more than three times
higher for Status Indians.-® In 1985, G. Rowe and M. J. Norris
projected that the 1996 IMR of Status Indians corresponds with
the 1971 non-First Nations level, a lag of 25 years.
Table I: Infant Mortality Rates, 1986-1990 
per thousand live births
0-12 months 1-12 months < 1 month
STATUS 13.8 7.9 6.0
INUIT 16.3 11.2 8.4
CANADIAN 7.3 2.5 4.7
[Source: Avard and Hanvey, The Health of Canada’s Children. 141.]
• Examining the causes of death, from 1989-1991 more Status Indian 
children died than other Canadians from the six most common 
causes of death listed in Table II. Out of six causes of death, 
only one category registered the same number of deaths. Sudden 
Death Infant syndrome was the leading cause of death of Indian 
babies, a rate three times greater than the Canadian rate.
^llen Bobet, inequalities in Health: A Comparison of Indian and Canadian 
Mortality Trends (Ottawa: Health & Welfare Cémada, 1990), n.p.
"G. Rowe and M. J. Norris, Mortality Projection of Registered Indians 1982 
to 1996 (Ottawa: StatsCan, 1985), 37.
14
Table II also shows that the injury death rate for First Nations 
infamts was almost four times that of Canadian infants.
Table II: Infant Death Rates for Selected Causes, 1989-1991
per thousand live births
Cause STATUS CDN
Birth Defects 2.8 2.2
Sudden Infant Death 2.4 0.8
Asphyxia, anoxia, 
hypoxia
1.2 1.2
Prematurity, Low 
birth weight
0.9 0.4
Injury 0.8 0.2
Pneumonia,
Bronchitis
0.7 0.3
[Source: Avard and Hêuivey, 142.]
• In 1990, Statistics Canada reported am overall Canadian 
disability rate of 5.2% among children under five years of age. 
A study of two Cree/Ojibwa communities in Northwestern Ontario 
found 12.1% were disaüsled.^ ^
^^Christopher Bagley, "Adoption of Native Children in Canada" in H. Alstein 
i R. Simon, eds. Intercountry Adoptions (New York: Praeger, 1991), 57. Because 
the total First Nations children disability rate is unavailable, I have included 
this figure to show that the rate is probably higher than the Canadian rate. The 
lack of comprehensive data on First Nations children is indicative of their 
status in society. In mainstream publications on issues such as Canadian 
children's health rights and risks, I find that First Nations children are 
relegated to a very minimal amount of text, despite the considerable evidence of 
their neglect.
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• From 1989-1991, the average injury death rate for Indian 
teenagers was more than three times greater than the Canadian 
rate.
• The adolescent suicide rate of First Nations was five times 
greater than the rate for for the rest of the Canadian 
population (see Table III).
• Table IV shows an equally disturbing comparison of death rates 
between the First Nations and non-First Nations populations.
Table III: Suicide Death Rates 10-19 years, 1986-1990
per 100,000
TOTAL MALE FEMALE
Status 37 54 19
Canadian 7 12 2
[Source: Avard and Héuivey, 144.]
Table IV: Death Rates, 1984-1987/88 per 100,000
Age Group Canadian Indian
1 - 1 4 29 85
15 - 24 81 284
All ages 661 953
[Source: Ellen Bobet, Inequalities in Health: A comparison of Indian and 
Canadian Mortality Trends (Ottawa: Health & Welfare Canada, 1990} n.p.]
:^ Avard and Hanvey, The Health of Canada's Children. 143.
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 ^ With respect to socio-economic indicators, First Nations
children are born into an environment that is less likely to meet 
their needs and ensure their healthy development than it is in the 
case of non-First Nations children. Consider the following points:
• While the child poverty rate of First Nations is unavailable, "a 
very high proportion of Aboriginal people live below the poverty 
line .,. many Aboriginal children in Canada experience living 
conditions similar to those in Third World countries.
I • Most First Nations children live in inadequate and crowded 
dwellings. Only 2% of Canadians are likely to live in crowded
j dwellings, compared to 11% of Indians off reserve, 29% of
i
I Indians on reserve and 31% of Inuit. Similarly, 6% of non-First 
Nations live in dwellings without central heating, compared to 
9% of Indians off reserve, 37% of Indians on reserve and 17% of 
Inuit.
• In 1991-92, 4% of children on reserve were 'in-care'; that is, 
they were designated wards of the state. While this figure has 
been reduced from 5.4% in 1981, it is important to note that 
this figure represents only on-reserve Status children and
"Avard and Hanvey, 140. 
“Avard and Hanvey, 137.
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excludes Status and non-Status children off-reserve, as well as 
Metis and Inuit children. Ten years ago, 20% of all children in
substitute care were from the First Nations community. At that
time, this community accounted for only 6% of Canada's 
population. Today, only 0.8% of non-First Nations children are 
in-care.^
• First Nations people age 15 to 49 have lower levels of education 
than other Canadians. Although the educational level of First 
Nations has improved in recent years, it is still lower than the 
overall Canadian level. In 1991, 17% of 15 to 49 year-old
Aboriginal people had less than 9 years of schooling, while 33% 
had some post secondary educatior for the total Canadian
population, the figures are 5% and 51% respectively.^®
• In 1991, First Nations people were less likely to be in the 
labour force, have lower income and more likely to be welfare- 
dependent than the rest of the Canadian population, as shown in 
Tables V and VI. The income distribution shown in Table VI 
provides evidence of the poverty of First Nations communities.
^^Community Panel, Family and Children's Services Legislation Review in 
B.C. Aboriginal Committee, Liberating Our Children: Liberating Our Nations. 
(Victoria: Ministry of Social Services, 1992), 1.
^"Statistics Canada, Schooling. Work and Related Activities. Income. 
Expansés and Mobility. 1991 Aboriginal Peonies Survey (Ottawa: Ministry' of 
Industries, Science «md Technology, 1993), xi.
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Table V: Labour Pource Participation, 1991 (percent)
All Aboriginals All Canadians
Employed 57 68
Unemployment rate 25 10
Table VI: Income, 1991 (percent)
Aboriginals Total Canadian
No Income 13 9
< $2,000 12 6
$2,000-$9,999 29 20
$10,000-$19,999 23 22
$20,000-$39,999 18 28
> $40,000 5 15
[Source: Statistics Canada, Work and Related Activities, xiv-xv ]
Aggregate statistics can provide glowing reports on the 
overall status of all Canadians. For example, the United Nations 
Development Programme's Human Development Report 1995 ranks Canada 
as the best place in which to live according to the human 
development index.UNICEF's annual report State of the World's 
Children consistently posts enviable statistics describing Canadian
^united Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 1995. (New 
York: Oxford Press, 1995), 18. The human development index (HDD is a
calculation used to rank the developmental progress of nations. According to 
UNDP, the HDI tcüces into consideration situations wherein people lead long and 
healthy lives, are able to acquire knowledge and have access to the resources 
I needed for a decent standard of living.
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children. However, the deplorable status of First Nations children 
is poorly represented by this type of assessment. Separate 
statistics for First Nations emphasize not only the disparities in 
Canadian society, but the depth and magnitude of the disparities.
These statistics expose inequities that are so great that one
cannot help but ask why. A discussion on the status of First 
Nations children cannot be separate from a discussion on the
colonial history of the First Nations peoples. Consistent with the
theory of internal colonialism,^® the subjugation of First Nations 
peoples by the domination of the state and white society begêui with 
first contact with the white man. The European immigrant society's 
assumption of superiority in all aspects - social, cultural, 
economic, political, religious and ethnic - developed into a state- 
sanctioned and society-condoned oppression of First Nations people.
With the gradual usurping of their land, the erosion of their 
traditional livelihoods and the imposition of European values, 
beliefs and institutions. First Nations peoples have been reduced
'^Colonialism: creating a sense of dependence among a nation or group, the 
objective of which includes the extraction of benefits by the dominant nation or 
group; as defined in M.O. Sinclair «md K. Bala, "Aboriginal Child Welfare in 
Canada" in W. Bala, et. al., eds., Canadian Child Welfare Law; Children. Families 
and the State (Toronto : Thon^son Educational Publishing, 1991), 130. It is 
generally accepted that internal colonialism refers specifically to the 
domination of indigenous peoples by a state created and governed by the foreign 
majority.
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to the we If are-dependent society that they are today. As Evelyn
Kallen explains in Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada.
Aboriginal population (Indians, Inuit and Metis), 
whose bicultural characteristics diverged most 
markedly from those of the dominant ethnic 
categories, were found at the bottom of Canada's 
ethnic hierarchy ... they constituted a racially 
stigmatized and structurally dependent ethnoclass 
having the lowest status of all minorities.”
The most blatant instrument of oppression was and continues to 
be the Indian Act.” In the government's méuiipulative language, the 
Act was intended to "protect" the uncivilized; in practice, it was 
a policy for assimilation intended to usurp their self-governing 
and self-determining powers, their land and livelihood, their 
societal and cultural traditions. Through this discriminatory act, 
the government legislated a separate identity for First Nations 
people, unequal to the rest of Canadian society, and imposed 
European management of their land and peoples. Over time, original 
peoples of this land became a minority, albeit a distinct one, 
dominated by the immigrant society.
With the Indian Act (1876), the government formalized the 
reserve system, which came to be regarded as a training ground in
’^Evelyn Kallen, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada (Toronto; Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 123.
"Original Act was passed in 1S75; subsequent 'major' amendments in 1351 
and 1985.
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i
i 'civilization' where the Indian could be taught to live like a
I
j European with European values, and thus made capable of being
assimilated."^^ The government's ever present intervention was
aimed at "producing both the material and cultural conditions which
would further the degree of conformity with anglo-European
standardsBrad McKenzie and Peter Hudson describe this process
as a systematic devaluation of the norms, values and opinions of
the native groups - a process, they argue, that continues today:
The historical benefits of land, fur and 
buffalo which accrued from the colonization 
of native people are well known. Less 
accepted is the fact that modem society 
continues to benefit from the dependency 
and under-development of native people ... 
for example, resource extraction on native 
land, native people as reserve labour and 
as consumers of goods and services, including 
social services.”
Because colonial relationships are systems of power, with the
dominant society wielding decision-making powers, the dominance and
misuse of power by the white society are clearly evident in the
treatment of First Nations children - the unwitting pawns of the
i "Kallen, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada. 173.
"Terry Wotherspoon and Vic Satzewich, First Nations: Race. Class and
Gender Relations {Scarborough: Nelson Ccmada, 1993), 84.I
"Brad McKenzie and Peter Hudson, "Native Children, Child Welfare «md the 
I Colonization of Native People," in Kenneth L. Levitt and BricUi Wharf, eds., The
I Challenge of Child Welfare (Vancouver: OBC Press, 1985), 130.
i
I
22
government's game of assimilation and subsequent integration. 
Intrusive Eurocentric regulation of childhood and family life among 
First Nations, jurisdictional disputes^  ^between the federal and 
provincial government regarding child service delivery and the 
blatant racism in policies, practices and child care workers, had 
deleterious effects to their children and their culture. It is now 
widely accepted that Canadian child welfare practices have been, 
and continue to be, a major factor in the deterioration of 
aboriginal cultures in Canada. Critics of native child welfare 
practices then and now conclude that these policies and practices 
towards First Nations children reflect a pattern of extension of 
colonial control.^
Assimilationist policies such as residential schooling,” the
I
“First Nations are effectively "wards of the federal state" by virtue of 
the Indian Act and its encumbent social-political-economic entitlement. However, 
jurisdictional disputes have always been problematic. In the Indian Act (1951), 
Section 88 subjected First Nations to provincial legislation, however 
indeterminate the legislation seems to be, as they apply to First Nations. For 
instémce, in matters of health and education. First Nations continue to be 
'objects' of jurisdictional disputes.
^^Sinclair and Bala, "Aboriginal Child Welfare in Canada," 171.
“Levitt and Wharf, eds. The Challenge of Child Welfare. 87.
^^Residential schools were first introduced in the 17th century. In the 
late 19th century they evolved to industrial residence schools, and were part of 
government practice until the late 1950s. The last closure of residential 
schools occurred in the 1970s.
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practice of non-aboriginal adoption prevalent in the 1960s,and 
the child apprehensions and foster care of the 1970s and 1980s 
I served to destroy the fabric of First Nations society. The 
cumulative effect of government policies and practices resulted in 
the most serious crisis in Canada's child welfare system.
Although First Nations were receptive to formal education and
!
! requested schools for their children, the residential schools 
I  created by the government and run by Christian missions were often 
miles away from the reserve. These schools necessitated the removal 
of children for up to 10-12 months of the year, in an environment
!
in which Indian lifeways were not permitted and the purpose of 
which was to get the "Indian" out of the child. The denial of 
language, cultural heritage, traditional practices and beliefs was 
"to separate our people from our culture and instill European 
cultural value in us.Worse, evidence of physical, emotional and 
sexual abuse came to light only recently, with the legacy of 
violence, alcoholism and abuse as a direct consequence. Devoid of 
normal family relationships and a sense of belonging and identity, 
Bagley explained that the residential schools "released" native
’“Familiarly known as the 60s scoop.
’“Community Panel, Liberating Our Children. 18.
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people from these schools "demoralized, bewildered, and uprepared 
for any but the most marginal existence.
With the decline in residential schools and the slow demise in 
the 1970s, aboriginal adoption and foster care supplanted the 
government's assimilation strategy. First Nations children 
effectively became wards of the province. In British Columbia 
alone, 40% of children in non-aboriginal adoptive homes were 
aboriginal children, despite the fact they represented only 4% of 
the population.“ Between 1984-1994, this number had decreased to 
30% while First Nations people represented approximately 5% of the 
provincial population.Owing to the imposition of the dominant 
society's standard of care and standard of living on First Nations 
communities, children were apprehended for short or long-term 
foster care or 'adopted-out' at an alarming rate. The government's 
failure to accept the legitimacy of the life philosopy and child- 
rearing practices of First Nations led to policies and practices in 
child care and welfare delivery that were entirely prejudicial 
against First Nations children.
“^Sinclair ouad Bala, "Aboriginal Child Welfare in Canada," 175.
^^ Panel to Review Adoption Legislation in EC, Report to the Ministry of 
Social Services (Victoria: Ministry of Social Services, 1994), 11.
*^ Panel to Review Adoption Legislation in EC, 11.
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The fostering of First Nations children by non-First Nations 
peoples, concurrent government funding for the adoptive family and 
the denial of the child's own culture had significant negative 
impact on the essence of family life within First Nations 
communities, and more importantly, on the identity of First Nations 
peoples. Their children were treated like commodities.'*^  In the 
case of the Spallumcheen Band in EC, 150 children were removed from 
the community from 1960-1980. Because the Band's population was 
only 300, the removal of these children "had a dramatic effect upon 
the community population and sense of future. " In most cases, the 
effects were tragic, not only from the perspective of cultural 
denial, but also from the overwhelming evidence of physical, 
emotional and sexual abuse by the adoptive family.**
The state's policy, using children as primary tools of 
assimilation, and the internalized discriminatory social codes in 
Canadian society have ensured that the cycle of victimization 
begins at birth and is passed on to succeeding generations.*® A 
First Nations child bom today faces cultural conflict.
*^ Cotnmunity Panel, Family and Children's Services Legislation Review in 
B.C., Liberating Our Children. 19.
**Bagley, "InterCountry Adoption, " 187.
^^Wotherspoon «md Satzewich, eds. First Nations. 88.
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jurisdictional disputes, a legislated identity, extreme poverty and 
other socio-economic problems. It is little wonder then that First 
Nations children are more likely to die at birth, are more 
susceptible to disease, live in inadequate homes, have lower levels
of education and live below the poverty line. They are more likely
i
I to get in trouble with the law or be substance abusers. As victims
i
I of abuse, they are likely to be abusers themselves. They are less
j likely to function within their potential in an environment hostile
I
to their needs as children, and later as adults. Sadly as Satzewich 
and Wotherspoon explain,
j
one of the devastating consequences of the social 
conditions experienced by native peoples is that 
very few of them have gone untouched by widespread 
poverty and related social afflictions either in 
their own experiences or through someone close 
to them. At their worst, these problems have 
created a certain inertia and hopelessness 
among some segments of the indigenous population.'*®
A significant response of the First Nations peoples, which
resounded even louder during the 1970s and 1980s (and up to today) ,
in face of the legacy of the assimilationist policies encapsulates
the frustration of the First Nations communities: "Is the system
**Wotherspoon and Satzewich, 103.
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conditioning our young for lives in institutions and not in 
society?
Monture argues that the "disregard of the Indigenous factor
within the Canadian child welfare system is merely a reflection of
the position of First Nations within Canadian society."*® Indicative
of life in the margins of society, Avard and Hanvey have reported
similarly abysmal statistics five years prior, commenting that.
It appears that little has changed. Aboriginal 
peoples live in deprived circumstances, and 
consequently, when combined with the implicit 
and explicit racism of our society, they are 
doubly oppressed.*®
That this historical reality has shaped the lives of First Nations
people is unquestionable. But what is even clearer is that First
Nations children are in need of protection. Because the legacy of
the past and oppression of today, far too many First Nations
children are denied a healthy childhood. In this case, it is
imperative that states are held accountable for their actions which
significantly affect those who cannot speak for themselves, and
more so, those whose voices are not permitted to be heard. The
'^'Sinclair émd Bala, "Aboriginal Child Welfare Laws," 172.
'^Monture, "A Vicious Circle," 7.
^^ Avard and Hanvey, eds.. The Health of Canada's Children. 146. Author's 
emphasis.
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reality of the lives of First Nations children raises the issue of 
legal recourse with respect to their neglect and abuse by the 
Canadian government and society.
The Conveation os the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child became the most 
rapidly ratified international human rights treaty in history. By 
1993, 159 countries had ratified the Convention. Canada ratified it 
in 1991.®°
The Convention, having arisen out of the non-binding 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1959) , became international 
law after 10 years of deliberations. It was initially proposed by 
the Polish Government in 1978. Increased human rights awareness 
evoked by continuing atrocities and casualties of war and the 
recognition of children as a "vulnerable group requiring special 
care and attention" opened the discourse of children's rights in 
the international arena. The Convention ultimately represents the 
culmination of fifty years of international efforts to set 
universal standards in human rights and encompasses the most
®°Ratification by the first twenty countries automatically enforces it as 
international law. UNICEF Canada, "Children's Rights in Camada," [information 
sheet].
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detailed and comprehensive in the rights it recognizes of all humsui 
rights instruments.^
Described as a Magna Carta for children, the Convention 
codifies childrens' rights insofar as they are obligations among 
signatory states. It contains fifty-four articles detailing the 
individual rights of any person under eighteen years of age to 
develop her or his full potential, free from hunger and want, 
neglect and abuse. It is a document of breadth, encompassing 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and 
acknowledges detrimental situations for children, including war and 
incarceration. Civil and political rights include the right to a 
name, nationality and identity. Economic rights include the right 
to a standard of living adequate for physical and mental 
development. Social rights ensure access to special services of 
the "highest attainable standard". Cultural rights include issues 
pertaining to information, education, leisure and freedom of 
expression. Among the international human rights instruments, the 
Convention's approach is unique because of its inclusion of what 
are traditionally known as first (civil and political) , second 
(socio-economic and cultural) and third generation (right to
^^ Philip Alston. "The Best Interests Principle: Towsurds a reconciliation 
of culture cuid human rights," in Alston, ed.. The Best interests of the Child: 
Reconciling Culture and Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 2.
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development, of indigenous peoples) rights. More importcuitly, it 
is the first human rights Convention to address all aspects of 
human development.
The Preamble begins as all other international human rights
instrument begin, with the usual statement of accession to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and its general
principles. It is critical to note that the importance of one's
culture is emphasized in the Preamble:
THE STATES PARTIES [sic] TO THE PRESENT CONVENTION,
... Taking due account of the importance of the 
traditions and cultural values of each people 
for the protection and harmonious development 
of the child ... Have agreed ...
The first five articles provide an overall framework 
under which the remaining articles are to be applied.” These five 
articles pertain to the definition of a child (Article 1), freedom 
from discrimination (Article 2), the principle of "best interest of 
the child" (Article 3), state obligations (Article 4) and the 
Rights and Duties of parents and guardians (Article 5) . These 
articles and the ensuing provisions” are to ensure the full and
“Alston, 11.
^^ Article 6 - survival and development; 7/8 - name, nationality and 
identity; 9 - parental care; 10/11 - family reunification ; 12/13 - freedom of 
expression; 14 - freedom of religion, thought, conscience; 15 - freedom of 
association; 16 - privacy; 17 - freedom of information; 18 - parental care; 19 - 
abuse; 20 - protection by the state when separated from families; 21 - adoption;
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harmonious development of his and her personality, the growth in a 
family environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding.
However, Article 3, the "best interest" principle is the
"leading" article of the Convention from which all decisions
affecting children are to emanate. As stated in UNICEF^ *
publications regarding the Convention,
The guiding spirit of the Convention, and the 
basis on which the other provisions must be 
judged, is that the best interest of the child 
must be a primary consideration in any decision 
about that child.
Recognizing the reality of the lives of peoples who do not 
belong to the dominant societies, the Convention includes a 
separate article for the protection of minority ethnic and 
indigenous rights.
22 - refugee children; 23 • disabled children; 24 • health; 25 - separation from 
family; 26 - social security; 27 - standard of living; 28/29 - education; 30 - 
minority euid indigenous rights ; 31 - rest ctnd play; 32 - economic exploitation; 
33 - substance éüsuse; 35 - sexual abuse; 35 - abduction and sale of children; 36
• éü)use and exploitation; 37 - torture eUid imprisonment; 38 - armed conflict; 
39 - recovery care; 40 - penal justice; 41 - accession to the law of State party 
or international law more conducive to the rights of the child; 42 - 
dissemination; 43 implementation and monitoring; 44 - submission reports to 
Committee; 45 - international cooperation; 46 - ratification; 49 - enforcement 
of the Convention as law; 50 • amendments ; 51 - reservations ; 52 - denunciation; 
53 - ON as depository of Convention; 54 - language «md signatories.
:^ The Uhited Nations Children's Fund was the lead ON agency in the drafting 
of the Convention. It remains the primary organization in the dissemination, 
implementation, monitoring and adjudication of the Convention.
'^Author's emphasis.
32
Article 30: In those States in which ethnic,
religious or linguisitic minorities or persons 
of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging 
to such a minority or who is indigenous shall 
not be denied the right, in community with 
other members of his or her own culture, to 
profess and practice his or her own religion, 
or to use his or her own language.
Further, Article 17, referring to a child's access to 
information, also includes ethnic minority and indigenous rights: 
"State Parties shall ... (d) encourage the mass media to have
particular regard to the linguistic needs of the child who belongs 
to a minority group or who is indigenous."
The Canadian government was actively involved in the drafting 
process of the Convention. In 1982, a federal-provincial- 
territorial working group was established to provide input on the 
text to the UN drafting committee. In the mid-1980s, the Assembly 
of First Nations began a "self-initiated" involvement®’ in the 
drafting process which resulted in Canada's ratification of the 
Convention with two reservations and one statement of 
understanding. These reservations and the statement, both of which 
pertain to Article 21, the adoption provision, were in effect
'^Canadieui Council on Children and Youth, "The Convention on the Rights of 
the Child: Backgrounder," Ottawa [photocopy], n.p.
"Senior Memager, Assembly of First Nations, Ottawa, telephone interview 
with the author, 23 May 1996.
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inserted at the request of First Nations organizations.®® 
Recognizing the significant negative impact of the adoption process 
affecting First Nations children which came to light at the same 
time during the early deliberations of the Convention, the First 
Nations groups ensured that Article 21 would not end the "customary 
forms of care" practiced by the First Nations community. 
Specifically, custom adoption®® may not be restricted by Article 21 
of the Convention. Further, the statement of understanding allows 
for the consideration of Article 30 (ethnic and indigenous rights) 
in "interpreting and applying all the rights in the Convention.” 
With the reservation and the statement of understanding, it appears 
that Canada has made a great effort to ensure that First Nations 
children 's rights are protected and promoted.
"A reservation indicates that a State is not bound by a certain article 
of the Convention due to a specific domestic situation. A statement of 
understanding- explains how a state interprets a certain article. The Assembly 
of First Nations, the Native Council of Canada, the Native Women's Association 
of Canada and the Metis National Council were consulted by the federal government 
with respect to the reservation and statement of understéuiding. See Canadian 
Council on Children and Youth, "The Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Backgrounder."
"In traditional First Nations philosophy, and unlike the adoption 
practices of the dominant society, a child is a member of the community, and 
therefore, the care of a child cam and does extend to the community, beyond the 
nuclear family to which the dominant society is accustomed. Their concept of 
adoption is much broader, in the sense that, it is not restricted to adoption of 
children, as in the dominant society. A family may adopt a grandparent, a child 
may adopt am uncle or an aunt, a mam may adopt another brother, and so forth. 
In Sinclair amd Bala, "Aboriginal Child Welfare Laws," 179.
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There is much hope for the Convention, as evidenced by its 
wide acceptance in most countries and its depiction as a "holistic 
and far-reaching instrument for the protection and development of 
the c h i l d . W i t h i n  the Canadian context, First Nations 
communities welcomed the Convention. The Native Council of Canada, 
now the Aboriginal Congress of Canada, responsible for both non­
status and status off-reserve First Nations reports that
[t]he Convention is a very welcomed development 
because it gives directions for governments to 
move in, to explore the current situation of 
children, to plan responses and to take actions 
to improve the situation of all children. It also 
provides indicators against which a government's 
actions can be assessed.
Similarly, the Assembly of First Nations states that
[t]he Convention on the Rights of the Child is a 
step in the right direction for not only First 
Nations children but all children in the world 
who are suffering. First and foremost, the 
Articles respect the interests, concerns and 
heritage of First Nations children. The United 
Articles value their existence.®^
*“Y.N. Kly, "On the Meaning and Significance of the Ctaited Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, " Canadian Review of Social Policy 27 
(1991): 67.
*^ Native Council of Canada, "Report by the Native Council of Canada on 
Canada's Response to the ON Convention on the Rights of the Child, " July 1993 
[photocopy], 4.
«^Assembly of First Nations, "To Respect the Child, You Must Respect the 
People : A Study of the Articles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child," November 1993 [photocopy], 1.
35
By setting a standard for the treatment of children, the 
Convention aspires to address injustices and inequities against all 
children. The question, however, is whether or not the Convention 
is responsive to the needs of marginalised children, of those 
living within the periphery of nations as a result of their 
exclusion from the dominant society.
Because the Convention was recently ratified and promulgated 
within Canada, there is no precedent upon which one can base an 
assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
Convention as a human rights instrument to ensure the equality of 
all children. However, one can examine the inherent conflicts 
which arise out of international human rights laws. These conflicts 
render the Convention problematic for those who live in the margins 
of society, especially the First Nations children of Canada.
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Chapter Three
The Origins of International Hnaan Rights Law, Universality
and Legal Pluralism
The central argument of this thesis is that the inherent 
conflicts in international laws render them inappropriate and
ineffective as instruments with which to protect the human rights 
of minorities and indigenous peoples. This chapter will indirectly 
critique the Convention by identifying these conflicts in
international human rights law in general. The focus will remain 
on the following issues: the differences between the ideology of 
international human rights laws and the ideology of the First 
peoples in Canada; universality versus cultural relativity; and 
legal pluralism. The first involves a discussion of the origins of 
human rights law, and the opposing worldview of First Nations 
peoples. The second is a discussion of the age-old discourse on
the standardization and normative aspects of international law on
one hand, and the relevance of culture, traditions and belief in 
the interpretation of law on the other. The third will identify 
the hierarchy of rights and the adversarial nature of rights that 
ensure the continuation of the status quo of the dominant society.
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Origins of International Hunan Rights Law
Before embarking on the origin of human rights, it is 
necessary to define human rights as understood by the dominant 
society. It is important to note that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) and subsequent human rights instruments do not 
explicitly define humcui rights. As Louis Henkin describes them, 
implicit in human rights is a commitment to individual worth.“ The 
essence of equality derived from personhood is embodied in human 
rights; it is neither bestowed nor granted by society; rather, all 
human beings are entitled to human rights for simply being bom. 
Henkin further states that "the idea of human rights is a political 
idea with moral foundations ... [I] t is an expression of the
political relationship that should prevail between individual and 
society.
"Louis Henkin, "The universality of the Concept of Human Rights," in Glen 
Hastedt and Kay Knickrem, eds., Towards the 21st Century: A Reader in World 
Polities. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), 369. The UN emphasis on 
individual rights as a legitimate international concern occurred after World War 
II. Recognition of the group rights of racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities existed prior to this time. A number of treaties euid “minority 
clauses" under the auspices of the League of Nations were signed, involving 
countries such as Czechoslovakia, Austria, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, 
Turkey, Rumania and Yugoslavia. See Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations. 5th 
ed. (New York: Macmillcux Publishing Co., 1986), 179-180.
There is a distinction between ethnic minorities and indigenous minorities, 
but recognition of group rights will not be explored in this analysis.
"Henkin, "The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights," 368.
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To understand the essence of human rights and to provide a 
sense of indeterminacy of these rights, the following six 
characteristics of human rights are noted by James Nickel:
1. Human rights are rights. Although
the meaning is unclear, 'rights' suggest 
that they are definite and high priority 
norms whose pursuit is mandatory.
2. They are universal. It [sic] implies 
that race, sex, religion, social position 
and nationality are irrelevant to 
whether one has human rights.
3. Human rights exist independently of 
recognition or implementation in the 
customs or legal systems of particular 
countries.
4. Human rights are important norms, 
strong enough as normative considerations 
to prevail in conflicts with contrary 
national norms and to justify international 
action on their behalf.
5. Human rights imply duties for both the 
individuals and governments, despite the 
fact that international human rights laws 
are obligation for, among and between 
states.
6. Human rights establish minimal standards 
of decent social and governmental 
practice.®®
Briefly re-stated, they are universal and normative standards, 
irrespective of race, sex, religion, class and nationality. 
Moreover, they are an obligation for, between and among states.
«James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights; Philosophical Reflections 
on the raaiversal-Declaration on Human Rights (Berkeley: university of California 
Press, 1987), 3.
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Taking into consideration these characteristics of human 
rights, do the rights under the Convention extend to First Nations 
children so that, for example, fewer children die at birth or under 
the age of five? To answer this question, it is necessary to 
examine the origin of international human rights law and assess its 
compatibility with First Nations life philosophy.
The contemporary notion of rights is rooted in Anglo-American 
legal theory. Briefly, the liberal ideology of life, liberty and 
property, as expounded by John Locke forms the basis of the 
philosophy of rights. From natural law inheres natural rights of 
individuals within, what Locke calls, a "political society."®® The 
concept of individual ownership as expressed in property rights 
necessitated a "political society" to which individuals submitted. 
More importantly, this political society guaranteed these rights to 
ownership. The notion of ownership in Locke's theory was "an 
individual labour-based possession" which legitimized individual 
acquisition and unlimited appropriation.®’ The pursuit of 
enlightenment ideas of progress and development ensured the
James W. Tully, "Rediscovering America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal 
rights," in 6. A. J. Rogers, ed., Locke's Philosophy; Content and Context 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 166.
'^'Arthur Dyck J., Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities; The Moral Bonds 
of Community (Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1994), 4-5.
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Strengthening of modem states and modem markets. It also ensured 
that law among nations reflected the relationship between states 
and markets. Thus, international law entrenched the notion of 
individual ownership in the English tradition and a political 
society closely resembling nation-statehood.
In contradistinction, First peoples of North America, living 
as they had for millenia, had a different life philosophy. Unlike 
the dominant European mode of organization, First Nations lacked 
the state-centered "political society." Further, their idea of 
ownership was better described as "stewardship." As James Tully 
explains,
[t]hey were a confederation of nations presided 
over by an assembly of national chiefs ... Each 
nation had a clearly demarcated and defended 
territory, a decision-making body, a consensus- 
based decision-making procedure and a system of 
customary laws and kinship relations. Moreover, 
with respect to property, the territory as a 
whole belongs to the nation, often women are 
custodians and jurisdiction over it is held in 
trust by the chiefs. It is inalienable, and the 
identity of a nation as a distinct people is 
inseparable from their relation to and use of 
the land, animals and entire ecosystem. Although 
land belongs to them, it is more accurate to say, 
as the Inuit stress, that they belong to the leuid.®®
"Tully, 180-181.
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The intrinsic connection between land and peoples is an 
important distinction, because it runs contrary to the principle of 
rights to ownership. Furthermore, their society based on collective 
obligations, as distinguished from rights, and consensus decision­
making are features which added to Locke's assessment of First 
Nations society as "uncivilized" and in a "state of nature." As 
Tully asserts, the social order of First Nations peoples was 
construed as an historically less developed form of European 
political organization, and not on par with European political 
formation.*®
As Mary-Ellen Turpel explains the difference, "aboriginal 
cultures are not simply different races - a difference explained in 
terms of biology (or colour) : aboriginal cultures are the
manifestations of a different human (collective) imagination." 
Further, she asserts that the right to private property as the 
cornerstone of the idea of rights runs contrary to this human 
imagination. As she explains, "the notion of rights based on 
idividual ownership is antithetical to the widely shared
"Tully, 167.
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understanding of creation and stewardship responsibilities of First 
Nations peoples, for the land, or for Mother Earth.
This seeming digression into the origins of rights and First 
Nations life philosophy may seem, on the surface, irrelevant to 
contemporary international human rights law. The divergence, 
however, is significant if one accepts the notion that "systems of 
laws are devised to suit the types of societies they are intended 
to support.Contemporary international human rights law, 
therefore, reflects societies which subscribe to enlightenment 
ideas of social, political and economic relations. As Nickel 
explains, "[t]he Universal Declaration of Human Rights replaces 
Locke's three generic rights - to life, liberty and property - with 
nearly two dozen specific rights."’^ Further, it ensured that human 
rights laws has three distinct features: first, it concerns
individual rights and freedoms; second, the organizational 
structure is the sovereign state. Third, it is an expression of 
social codes and relations incompatible with First Nations 
philosophy.
°^Mary Ellen Turpel, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Chcurter of Rights 
and Freedoms," Canadian Women's Studies 10, no. 2/3, 150-152.
’^ James K. Feibleman, Justice. Law & Culture (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1985), 63.
-^Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights. 4.
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With respect to individual rights and freedoms, Blackburn 
states that,
[t]he single objective of human rights theory auid 
now of humcui rights law, has therefore always 
been to protect weak individuals from the 
oppression of powerful groups, by giving them 
inalienable rights which inhere in them as 
individuals.^
International human rights law, therefore, is linked to the
paramountcy of individuals. As Paul Hazard explains,
it [human rights] is linked to cultures in 
which the importance of the individual is 
acknowledged and backed by a body of law to 
which this individual can appeal in defense of 
his or her rights against other individuals or 
the State.
The second feature of contemporary international human rights 
regime is that it is state-centric. The importance of state 
sovereignty is integral to the notion of human rights. As Falk 
explains, the prevailing structure and organizational feature is 
the sovereign state.''® While the reasons for postwar development 
in human rights may have been spurred by the atrocities of war, it
"Robert Blackburn and John Taylor, eds. Human Rights for the 1990s: Legal. 
Political and Ethical Issues (London: Mansell, 1991), 38.
"Olwen Hufton, "Introduction" in Olwen Hufton, ed., Historical Change &
Human Rights (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 2.
''^ Richard Falk, "Cultural Foundations for Protection of Human Rights," in 
Abdullahi An'Naim, ed., Human Rights in Cross Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for
Consensus (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 55.
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is also for and about the international system of states. As 
Sanders explains, three reasons for the interest in and development 
of contemporary international human rights law are state 
legitimacy, peace and political stability in the international 
system, and recognition of transnational actors."'® Despite the 
notion of rights of the individual, human rights are products of 
states. As we shall see later on in this chapter, this presents a 
curious situation for those who live on the margins of society.
The third aspect of modem human rights law is that it is an 
expression and agency of power. The evolution of "customary norms" 
to a codified form elevates relations to "an aspect of political 
power." It then becomes an expression of power because it is 
couched in terms of rights and freedoms, and as Carol Smart 
explains, gives the impression of extending 'rights,' not creating 
wrongs/" As an example of this, the notion of life, liberty and 
property justified slavery in America in the face of human rights 
documents such as the American Declaration of Independence and Bill 
of Rights. Similarly, the same concepts justified the European
’®Sanders, "International Human Rights Law, Spring 1996," IA-A-2.
"Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (New York: Routledge, 1989)
142.
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colonization and dispossession of Indians in American 'terra
nullius' centuries ago.’® As Maureen Davies explains,
[t]raditionally, Aboriginal Peoples have been 
considered to be the objects rather than the 
subjects of international law. European 
powers were directly responsible for the 
content and direction of this facet of law 
and it is therefore not suprising that the 
interests of Aboriginal Peoples have not 
found adequate representation and protection 
at this level.’®
Universality versus Relativity
The normative aspects of international law dictate a specific 
character of human rights laws: they are universal and neutral in 
application. This universalist value consideration dates back to 
Roman times when Cicero (106-43 BC) stated that "true law is right 
reason, in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, 
unchanging and everlasting ... justice is one; it binds all 
society, and is based on one law."®° In the same vein, all human 
rights documents begin with the emphasis that all human beings are
’"Tully, "Rediscovering America,” 174.
’%aureen Davies, "Aspects of Aboriginal Rights in International Law, " in 
Bradford W. Morse, ed.. Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian. Metis and Inuit 
Rights in Canada, rev 1st ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), 43.
’’Paul R. viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, eds.. International Relations Theory 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993), 533.
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entitled to the same rights and freedoms without distinction of any 
kind. Moreover, these rights and freedoms "must be uniform in 
different applications.
The debate over the universality, uniformity and neutrality of
international law is irresolvable inasmuch as the outcome depends
on the perspective through which one chooses to see the world. As
Philip Alston comments,
[a]t a certain level, the debate over the nature 
of the relationship between international or 
'universal' human rights standards and 
different cultural perspectives and context 
can never be resolved. Thus, the very 
aspiration to achieve acceptance of certain 
universal standards invites continuing 
controversy and provokes the assertion of 
relativistic positions."
Cultural relativists argue that the absence of contextual
diversity in international human rights instruments is superfluous
and ineffective at best and is supportive of the status quo at
worst. Paul Carrington, in a vociferous argument against the
universalist tendency of international law, states the following:
Lengthening the lists of humêui rights or 
principles of natural law is a form of 
non-violent imperialism, depriving as it 
does the choice of social arrangements
'^ Carlos Santiago Nino, The Ethics of Human Rights (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1991), 30.
"Alston, "The Best Interests Principle," 16.
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open to a self-governing state or 
community."
Further, this 'pursuit of the single truth' evident in
universality and neutrality constitutes, he argues, "the one great
theoretical design for positive law (might we call it justice?)
that will best advance our increasingly unified human condition.
He asserts, as an example of this pursuit of the single truth, that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) constitutes "a
proclamation that the whole world should resemble as nearly as
possible suburban middle class America."" Similarly, An-Na'im
states that
normative universality in human rights, 
including the rights of the child, should 
neither be taken for granted nor achieved 
through the "universalization" of the norms 
and institutions of dominant cultures, 
whether at the local, regional or 
international levels."
The debate over the generalist nature of international human 
rights laws and the absence of specificity elicits the following
“^ Paul D. Carrington, "Aftermath," in P. Cane and J. Stapleton, eds., 
Essays for Patrick Attivah (Clarendon Press : Oxford, 1991), 114.
"Carrington, 114.
’^ Carrington, 114.
"An-Na'im, "Cultural Transformation and Normative Consensus on the Best 
Interests of the Child, " in Alston, ed. The Best interests of the Child. 62.
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question: What exactly is omitted from this discourse? It omits 
the interplay of forces such as ethnicity, class and gender vis-a- 
vis dominant social, political and economic structures. The 
distinct omission of ethnicity, class and gender perspectives in 
legal instruments renders a homogeneous perspective to 
heterogeneous situations. The notion of empowering all peoples 
equally because individuals are subject to the same laws and these 
laws guarantee due process equally is simplistic and arguably 
false. The 'objectification' in the name of universality, 
neutrality and uniformity, or the lack of 'subject positioning', 
negates the reality of difference between the dominemt race, class 
and gender, and that of the minority. As Catherine Mackinnon 
argues, "[I]n reality begins principle ... [B]ehind all law is 
someone's story - someone whose blood if your read closely, leaks 
through the lines. Text does not beget text; life does."®''
Essentially, international human rights instruments do not 
take into account power relations between rich and poor, male and 
female, 'coloured' and 'white' races. For those who do not belong 
to the dominant society, the implications are great. As Patricia 
Williams states.
‘^ Catherine Mackinnon, "Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace," in Stephen Shute 
and Susan Hurley, eds.. On Human Rights. 83.
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[11 aw and legal writing aspire to formalized, 
color-blind, liberal ideals ... Neutrality 
is the standard for assuring these ideals, 
yet the adherence to it is often determined 
by reference to an aesthetic of uniformity 
in which difference is simply omitted ... 
race neutrality in law has become the 
presumed antidote for race bias in real life."
While Williams’ analysis refers to 'race,' it is nonetheless
interchangeable with a class and gender analysis. To omit
distinctions of race, class and gender variables is to misconstrue
the reality of power relations in society. The universal and
neutral quality of international human rights laws ensures,
therefore, that individuals requiring the most significant
guarantee are offered the least protection. To explain this
anomaly, Diane Bell states that
[t]he impetus to universalize glossed over 
differences in a way that, it could be argued 
has been an impediment to its realization, and 
that partly explains the reluctance of certain 
states to implement it or, once they have 
adopted it, explains the lack of success in 
achieving its goals."
The universal normative considerations of international human 
rights laws emphasize sameness and gloss over difference. An-na'im
"Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 85.
-’Diane Bell, ''Considering Gender; Are Human Rights for Women, Too?" in 
An'Naim, ed., Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives. 354.
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questions this principle in asking "by whose criteria or according 
to which philosophical framework can the universality of the norms 
in question be declared or verified?"®®
While many minorities (racial minorities, women, homosexuals) 
seek equality and protection from discrimination, indigenous 
peoples seek recognition and protection of their cultural 
distinctiveness.®^ Unfortunately for First Nations, normative 
considerations of international human rights law encourage and 
endorse sameness more than they reflect the politics of difference.
Legal Pluralisn
This section focuses on the third aspect which hinders 
international human rights laws from protecting the rights of First 
Nations children: legal pluralism. The plurality of legal codes 
exists at two levels: one on the hierarchy of laws within the 
international human rights framework; the other, on the competing 
and adversarial rights within a particular law. As Farida Shaheed 
explained in her discourse on law and Muslim women, "in any given
’°An-Na ' im, “Cultural Trams formation, " S6.
“Samders, "International Humam Rights Law, Spring 1996," M-A-l, 11.
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context, a plurality of laws exist in a hierarchy."*^ This 
hierarchy is evident in the approximately twenty-one international 
human rights instruments upon which a person can base a claim. 
First and presumably foremost of these human rights codes is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Subsequent 
Conventions include the International Covenant on Economic and 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) , .and 
so forth.These Conventions, which all accede to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, are to create the conditions for just 
and equal treatment of individuals in all aspects of society.
However, in the case of the protection of the rights of 
children, this plurality has been presumed to be avoided, since, as 
mentioned earlier, the Convention is the most comprehensive human 
rights instrument thus far, avoiding various 'generations' of 
rights in one document. As Lawrence LeBlanc explains.
’^ Farida Shaheed, "Controlled or Autonomous," Signs : Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society 19 (1994), 1005.
”Jéunes W. Zion, "North American Indian Perspectives on Human Rights," in 
An-Na'im, Human Rights. 192.
'*For a list of basic documents, see Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on 
Human Rights. 3d. ed. (Oxford: Cléurendon Press, 1993) .
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[t] raditionally, human rights have been throught 
of in terms of two principal categories: civil 
and political rights; and economic, social and 
cultural rights ... [T]he substantive articles 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
reflect this "new" way of thinking because they 
affirm a broad range of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights while 
making no formal distinction among them.”
What is crucial, however, is the notion of 'competing rights' 
arising out of binary opposites within legal doctrines. As Barbara 
Johnson explains, "[b]ecause rights are categorical, they often 
come in contradictory pairs."” Thus, the right of one, is the loss 
of right for another. For example, in human rights law, 
contradictory rights arise between state rights and individual 
rights, between individual rights and group (collective) rights, 
between the right to autonomy and the right to be cared for, 
between the right to self-determination and the right to cultural 
belonging.
To illustrate the this hierarchy of rights, perhaps it is best 
to begin with the binary opposition of state rights and individual 
rights. The paramount principle of international human rights laws
’^ Lawrence Leblanc, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: United 
Nations Lawmaking on Human Rights (Lincoln: University o£ Nebraska Press, 1995), 
xvii.
''Barbara Johnson, "Introduction," in Barbara Johnson, ed., Freedom and 
(New York, Basic Books, 1993), 7.
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which have emerged from the European state system is that they are 
obligations among states. Because signatories to public 
international law are states, the 'contract' is not between the 
international community and the individual; it is for, among and 
between states. Further, because of the absence of a supranational 
legal enforcement mechanism, the only deterrent to violation of 
human rights is the signatory states' obligation to other states. 
Gerhard von Gian explains that "as yet, it is the state that 
possesses an international legal right, not the individual."” This 
presents a curious anomaly. As Mackinnon explains, "states are the 
only ones recognized as violating human rights, yet states are the 
only ones empowered to redress them."’® Therefore, the fulfilment 
of individual rights rests with a states' moral commitment to 
fulfil those rights.
This poses a difficult problem because the definition of a 
moral obligation of state rests in the hands of the powerful few. 
Because states, as subjects of international law, are self­
determining and self-governing, how the state treats its citizens 
is subject to domestic policy made of the national interest as
”Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations. 6th ed. (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan 
Canada, 1992), 249.
"MacKinnon, "Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace," 93.
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defined by the state. Inasmuch as the state machinery is to
protect the individual, inaccessibility to this protection due to
differing conceptual and experiential power relations between state
and individuals renders the protection ineffective. One simply has
to look at the gross human rights violations in all comers of the
world, especially against women and children, that go unabated to
understand the weakness of the system. As Jack Donnelly argues,
"[P]ublic international law and international organizations are
products of states, not of a cosmopolitan world community. They are
instruments of, not alternative to, States."”
First Nations peoples are doubly-bound because of the systemic
adversarial position of States and individuals, and their distance
as colonised minorities from the state machinery. In explaining
this dilemma, Falk states that
... to the extent that international law 
of human rights is an exclusive result of 
of the States system, it cannot hope to take 
into account of the values and needs of 
peoples that are not adequately represented 
in that system or even constituted to qualify 
for membership.
"Jack Donnelly, "Third Generation Rights," in Catherine Brolmann, Rene 
Lefeber and Marjolaine Zieck, eds. Peoples and Minorities in International Law 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 145.
ioopalk, "Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human 
Rights," 48.
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In addition, he claims that exclusion from the rights forming 
process is a denial of human rights, inasmuch as the protection 
offered is in an oblique and obscure manner, and that those 
excluded are likely to be taken into account (if at all) in a 
partial and paternalistic manner.
Another binary opposition is that of the individual versus
group (collective) rights. This problem is especially acute for
ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples as their peoples struggle
for recognition of their rights as a collective in Canada and the
world over. Rhoda Howard claims that indigenous groups want
recognition of collective rights, moreso than individual rights:
... they are interested in the recognition of 
their collective dignity, in the acknowledgement 
of the value of their collective way of life as 
opposed to the way of life of the dominant society 
into which they are unequally integrated.
Notwithstanding the indigenous struggles for self-determination 
and self-governance, the distinction between individual rights and 
groups rights is important. This presents a binary opposition 
between individual and collective rights, which begs the question, 
which comes first? Natan Lemer states that while "the individual
:"Palk, 47.
"^'Rhoda Howard, "Dignity, Community and Human Rights," in An-Na’im, ed. 
Human Rights in Cross Cultural Perspectives. 84.
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is the object of protection in these [group rights cases], the
fundamental element is the group. This presents a clear case of
competing rights; for First Nations, it is often under the rubric
of group rights that their rights to their own cultural expression
and cultural belonging are upheld. Most international human rights
laws acknowledge the right to belong to an ethnic community without
acknowledging the right of that community to self-determination.
By this action, the international community again recognizes the
rights of peoples to self-determination most closely linked with an
independent state. This means, as Shaheed explains,
[t]hat law therefore flows from the social relations 
it seeks to codify and --by both prescription and 
prohibition -- projects an ideal for society and 
demarcates the boundaries within which persons are 
free to act, including the limists within which
they must formulate both a collective and
individual identity.
Johnson argues that " [N] othing in the concept of rights can 
negotiate the conflict that arises out of [such] binary 
opposites.
:"Nacan Lemer, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990, 31.
"^'Shaheed, "Controlled or Autonomous, " 1012.
Johnson, "Introduction," 7.
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The Sandra Lovelace Case
This case succinctly illustrates the dilemma which faces First 
Nations peoples as it captures the pressures emanating from the 
origin of international human rights law, the universality of these 
laws and the plurality of legal codes.
Sandra Lovelace, a Maliseet from Tobique, New Brunswick, lost
her Indian status (that is, registration as an Indian with the
Canadian state) upon marriage to a non-Indian man. Section
12(1) (b) of the Indieui Act (1951) stated that.
The following persons are not entitled to be 
registered namely, ... (b) a woman who married 
a person who is not an Indian, unless that 
woman is subsequently the wife or widow of a 
person described in section 11.
After losing status upon marriage to a non-Indian, Lovelace was 
unable to return to her community in Tobique reserve upon the 
dissolution of her marriage. With respect to sexual discrimination 
in the Indian Act, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1973 
(Attorney General v. Lavell and Isaac et al. v. Bedard) that the 
Indian Act was exempt from, and in fact, superceded the Canadian 
Bill of Rights. This ruling left Lovelace no other domestic legal 
recourse. From this premise, Lovelace applied to the International 
Human Rights Commission (the Commission) in 1977 to address the 
issue of sexual discrimination in the Indian Act. In 1981, the
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Commission ruled that the government of Canada breached the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as ratified 
by Canada in 1976. Specifically, Canada, through the Indian Act, 
violated her right to reside in the reserve, as stipulated in 
Article 27:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied by the • 
right, in community with the other members of 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practice their own religion, or to use 
their own language.^ ®®
The Commission elided the issue of gender-based discrimination 
in the Indian Act by citing that Lovelace had lost her status upon 
marriage in 1970, six years prior to Canada's ratification of the 
Covenant in 1976. It stated that, "as regards Canada, it can only 
consider alleged violations of human rights occurring on or after 
19 August 1976."^? The Commission's decision addressing Lovelace's 
cultural rights over sexual rights led Lillian Krossenbrink- 
Gelissen to ask, "which rights come first? Femaleness or 
ancestry?"^*
"^‘United Nations Human Rights Committee. Lovelace v. Canada, as excerpted 
in Sêuiders, "International Human Rights Laws, Spring 1996," A-C-7, 76.
-“’United Nations Human Rights Committee, A-C-1, 69-70.
-“■Lilliane Krossenbrink-Gelissen, Sexual Equality as an Aboriginal Right 
(Saarbrucken: Verlag breitenback Publishers, 1991), 111.
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While this landmark case was a catalyst for an amendment in 
the Indian Act in 1985, it nonetheless illustrates that the 
international human rights regime is inappropriate and ineffective 
in upholding Lovelace's birthright to equality. First, the 
Commission did not address the issue of sex discrimination. Second, 
while Sanders states that " [t] he story of the Lovelace case is 
beloved at the United Nations, for it is seen as proving that the 
individual communications system under the Covenant can work, he 
questions the role of the decision in the Canadian government's 
amendment.During the 1970s and 1980s, First Nations women's 
organizations brought the issue of sexual discrimination in the 
Indian Act to the forefront of politics of First Nations/non-First 
nations relations, and it subsequently became a major political 
issue in Canada.Third, while the amendment. Bill C-31, in 
principle reinstated women who had lost their status due to 
marriage, discrimination has now been passed on to the "second 
generation", that is, to the offspring of unions of status and non-
”^Sanders, "Developing a Modem International Law, Spring 1996" A-B-4. 
•^“Sanders, A-B-4.
'^ S^anders, A-B-4.
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status First N a t i o n s . Neither the Commission nor the Canadian 
government through Bill C-31, attempted to eliminate sex 
discrimination. I suggest that the exclusion of First Nations 
female voices in the construct of international law, the commitment 
to universality in the international regime and the configuration 
of adversarial rights contributed to the denial of Lovelace's 
birthright.
It is ironic that the international community upheld 
Lovelace's right to a collective identity which the Canadian 
government has as yet failed to recognize de facto, despite the 
entrenchment of aboriginal rights in Section 35 of the 
Constitution. The fact that First Nations women have a legislated 
identity, apart from a negative, socially constructed identity by 
the dominant society in Canada, in the face of international human 
rights laws points to the fact that ancestry indeed supercedes 
femaleness. Clearly, Lovelace was attempting to assert her human 
rights in a system of law that is ill-equipped to deal with unjust 
treatment stemming from inequitable gender, class suid ethnic 
relations. This is where Lovelace's case relates to First Nations 
children.
a detailed explanation, see Native women's Association of Canada, 
Guide to Bill C-31: An explanation of the 1985 amendment (Ottawa: NWAC, 1986) .
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The Lovelace case was as much an issue of ethnicity and class 
as it was of gender. I suggest that the implications of the 
Convention on First Nations children are the same as those raised 
in the Lovelace Case. While the implications are the same, the 
effect is greater because First Nations children, as all children, 
require a voice to speak for them, auid are physiologically, 
emotionally and spiritually dependent on caregivers until 
adulthood. However, unlike other children. First Nations children 
are at greater risk precisely because of these implications.
To recapitulate, this chapter examined three foundational 
aspects of international human rights law: the origin, the
universality and the plurality of legal codes. From this 
examination, there is a distinct feature of international human 
rights law that hinders the protection of First Nations peoples, as 
supported by the Lovelace case. International human rights law is 
an expression and an agency of power. Owing to its enlightenment 
roots, it is an expression of power in that it speaks of the 
interests of the dominant society. Or, as Nickel comments with 
respect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is an 
attempt to "set forth the norms that exist within enlightened
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moralities.""^ Moreover, although it purports to be a universal, 
neutral and uniform arbiter, it is an agency of power because the 
system can deny, withhold or contravene rights by virtue of its 
expression. There is an underlying assumption of unity of society 
and nation that serves to obscure material relations of conflict 
and oppression.""4 Further, the unity expressed in human rights 
instruments oversimplifies complex power relations, meaning that 
the "acquisition of rights in a given area may create the 
impression that a power difference has been resolved.""®
What might this mean for a First Nations child? The next 
chapter will critique the Convention on the basis of these 
troubling theoretical foundations.
^Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights. 1987.
"*Marlee Kline, "Child Welfare Law, Best Interests of the Child Ideology 
and First Nations," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 30, 2 (1992), 415.
‘^ S^mart, Feminism and the Power of Law. 144.
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Chapter Four
In Whose Best Interest?
There is another United Nations (UN) treaty 
... that specifically protects the rights of 
the indigenous child. It is a human rights 
treaty known as the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.
Since the UN's adoption of the Convention and Canada's 
subsequent ratification are recent occurrences, it is perhaps 
premature to assess empirically the effectiveness of the 
Convention. In this section, I take issue with Cynthia Price 
Cohen's endorsement quoted above and examine the practical 
implications of the Convention on First Nations children. Using 
the previous chapter's arguments as the basis for the following 
critique of the Convention, this section identifies anticipated 
sites of conflict and contradictory positions in which First
“'Cynthia Price Cohen, "Rights of the Indigenous Child, " St. Thomas Law 
Review 7, 3 (1995) : 558. Cohen participated in the drafting of the Convention 
from 1983 to 1989. Her support of the Convention as it applies to Native 
American children is evident in this article. She states that "... this treaty 
protects the rights of the indigenous child in many ways - by respecting the 
child's cultural heritage and also by supporting a standard of living that 
includes health and education. It is to the benefit of IndicUi children for the 
United States to ratify this treaty." (p. 566)
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Nations children find themselves trapped - a consequence not of 
their own making since, as illustrated by the preceding chapter, 
they reside furthest from the structure of international law. As 
the jurisprudence of children's rights is still nascent in the 
international community, this critique raises questions more than 
it seeks to resolve issues.
In the broadest sense, the primary problem arises from the 
duplication and overlap in the international human rights system. 
As Sanders asserts, the situation of indigenous people in Canada 
can be discussed in various treaty bodies under six core 
treatiesBecause Canada has signed all core treaties, First 
Nations children as claimants of rights can be argued in light of 
these treaties, and not necessarily vis-a-vis the Convention alone.
Further, the Convention, though it is purportedly designed to 
protect individual rights, lacks an Optional Protocol, a mechanism 
through which an individual can access international human rights 
laws. According to Sanders, an Optional Protocol "allows
states that there are now six core international human rights treaties 
which have come into effect since 1966: The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social cuid Cultural Rights; 
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention against 
Torture. Sêuiders, "Developing a Modem International Law on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, a report for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
December, 1994," in Sanders, "International Human Rights Law, Spring 1996," lA-A- 
4, 4-S.
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individuals to take cases to the [International Human Rights] 
Committee for adjudication, after the exhaustion of reasonable 
domestic remedies. The lack of an Optional Protocol is a
serious omission. States party to the Convention accept that they 
are "legally accountable for their actions towards children,yet 
despite the encouragement of Amnesty International during the 
drafting process, there is no provision for either inter-State or 
individual petition.Instead, the Convention relies on periodic 
State monitoring reports as the enforcement mechanism. In speaking 
of human rights, Mackinnon states that "[e]nforcement is mainly 
through reporting, meaning moral force, meaning effective 
noneforcement.
The uselessness of the Convention in international 
jurisprudence is illustrated by the recent case of Daniela 
Wilner,^“ a child bom in Canada to Argentine parents. Locked in 
a custody battle between two continents, her father, Eduardo Mario
^"Sanders, A-B-3.
“^Rose D'Sa, "The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child," 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 19, 3 (July 1993] : 1274.
«“Rose D ’Sa, 1275.
«^Mackinnon, "Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace," 97.
«‘Mark Beilis, “Mom fights to regain daughter," Toronto Star 05 July 1995, 
A20. See also de Wilner v. Hilner [1996] O.J. 670 (Ont. Ct. of Justice).
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Wilner, applied to the International Human Rights Commission under
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects on the Abduction of
Children (1980) to facilitate Daniela's return to Canada. Despite
the extensive provisions of the Convention, parties acting "on
behalf of" Daniela did not have access to these provisions.
Remaining within the global perspective, another crucial issue
is the recognition of the rights of indigenous children. As
♦
previously stated, Article 30 recognizes "cultural" minorities,
including indigenous peoples. While most of the encoded rights are
stated in positive terms, such as the right to a name and
nationality (Article 7), the right to freedom of expression
(Article 13), and so forth. Article 30 is stated in negative terms :
... a child belonging to such a minority 
or who is indigenous shall not be denied 
the right . .
This is not a minor point. As Manfred Nowak explained in a 
critique of a parallel article in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,
[s]ince Article 27 of the Political Covenant
’'^ T^he Commission ruled that the child be returned to Canada, which the 
Supreme Court of Argentina upheld. Whether or not the decision is in Daniela's 
"best interest" is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the case illustrates 
that despite its designation as a "core" treaty, the Convention cannot be invoked 
in the intemationéü. court.
“‘Highlighted text is author's emphasis.
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is phrased with the typically negative 
formulation that members of minorities 
"shall not be denied" certain rights, 
positive state obligations to affirmative 
action ... cannot be inferred from this 
provision.
Similcirly, Sanders states that "it [Article 27] does not describe 
a positive obligation on the State to ensure conditions that will 
permit cultural minorities to survive and develop.
Notwithstanding the problem areas discussed above, the more 
crucial issue pertaining to First Nations children is that the 
protection and promotion of children's rights depend entirely on 
the State's commitment to children. For First Nations children, 
this is highly problematic because of competing discourses within 
the State.
In the first instance, representation is the foremost site 
of struggle for First Nations children. Who speêücs for them? The 
nature of discourses chsmges depending on whether it is the federal 
government, ministerial bureaucracies, child-serving agencies, 
individuals or collectives who put forth children's concerns. For
“'Manfred Nowak, "The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law, 
Comments" in Catherine Brolmann, Rene Lefeber, Marjoleine Zieck, eds., Peoples 
and Minorities in International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nihjoff Publishers, 
1993), 109.
“‘Sanders, "Developing a Modem international Law, " in " International Human 
Rights Law, Spring 1996," M-A-1, 11.
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centuries, child advocacy has either excluded the voices of First 
Nations children or presented them in a manner which excluded the 
reality of their experiences. Discourses of advocacy and charity, 
whether by the State or by individuals and collectives, have had 
deleterious results for First Nations children. Residential 
schools, child apprehension, adoption policies, exclusive child- 
service delivery have all contributed to the abysmal status of 
First Nations children presented in the earlier chapter. 
Misrepresentation of what is in the "best interest" of a First 
Nations child has and will continue to pose grave dangers.
D'sa asserts that the Convention "could become relevant where 
it would be most effective -- in national c o u r t s . S h e  argues 
that there is scope for referring to extrinsic materials such as 
international human rights laws in domestic proceedings. The 
history of domestic litigation for First Nations, especially with 
respect to children, has been detrimental. As Bradford Morse 
claims, social policies, provincial family legislation and the
^^Rose O'Sa, "The Dhited Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,"
1281.
iJ'D'Sa, 1281.
69
actions of the judiciary are largely to blame for the 
destabilization of native families and communities.
Competing discourses with respect to First Nations cases
essentially reflect the divergence of laws between First Nations
and the dominant society, between the unwritten customary laws of
First Nations, the Canadian Constitution and the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. Whereas the dominant society speaks of rights
achievable through litigation. First Nations rely on consensus on
social responsibilities;
Our Nations developed consensus on 
social responsibilities, and traditions 
for affirming that consensus. Social 
consensus is based upon a shared 
agreement of individuals to exercise 
a variety of responsibilities.^^®
Taking into consideration these divergent laws, Morse asserts 
that
[t]he courts, the statutes and the policies all 
tend to reflect a common perception, that is, 
that the native people ... are unable to meet 
adequately their own family needs through their 
own policies, programs, and laws.
“’Bradford W. Morse, "Indian and Inuit Family Law and the Canadiém Legal 
System," American Indian Law Review 8. 2 (1980), 199.
““Community Panel, Family and Children's Services Legislation Review in 
B.C., Liberating our Children. 7.
“4ïorse, "Indian and Inuit Family Law emd the Canadian Legal System," 199. 
For further discussion, see works by Mary-Ellen Turpel amd Marlee Kline.
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Recourse to domestic litigation questions the very essence of
a First Nations child. Will she or he be treated as an individual
irrespective of ethnicity, class and gender, or as a member of a
collective struggling to forge an identity as a separate and
distinct nation? This is a paramount question which illustrates
the complexity of issues pertaining to First Nations children. On
one hand, it is the right to belong to an ethnic community that
provides a better chance of ensuring that a First Nations child's
needs are met. On the other, what of individual rights, which are
the central tenet of human rights? As Howard asserts, some rights
need to be fulfilled as precondition for the exercise of other
rights.^: In this case, the rights of a First Nations child to
proper shelter, food, health care, and so forth, depend on her/his
belonging to an ethnic community. She strongly argues that "human
(individual) rights and collective rights are incompatible.
Further, she states that,
[t]he assertion of collective, community or people's 
rights does not simply mean an extra right of 
individuals to belong to intact communities that 
embody their own cultural identity. Such assertion
“^Howard, "Dignity, Community euid Human Rights, " 96. 
^^Howard, 99.
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also can, and frequently does, mean violation of 
individual rights."*
Because First Nations children's identity is tied to the 
collective, will assertions of individual First Nations children's 
rights threaten the identity of the collective?
First Nations communities have deemed that assertion of 
individual rights through access to the dominant legal system 
prejudices their position because it undermines their ethnicity."® 
Claiming individual rights in dominant courts, according to Turpel, 
"is particularly threatening, perhaps even ethnocidal, to 
Aboriginal Peoples who are on the brink of cultural destruction 
because of the legacy of colonialism and paternalism under the 
Indian Act.""® First Nations children then are entrapped, not only 
by the dominant society, but also by their own communities. There 
is even the danger that because children cannot speak for 
themselves and therefore rely on their communities to voice their
^^ H^oward, 97.
^^This conflict between individual and collective rights was illustrated 
in the recent Constitutional talks in which the voices of First Nations women 
were excluded. In direct opposition to the Assembly of First Nations, the Native 
Women's Association of Canada and other women's organizations appealed to the 
court to secure a voice in the Constitutional reform talks.
"'Mary Ellen Turpel, as quoted in Jo-Anne Fiske, "The Womb is to the Nation 
as the Heart is to the Body, " Paper presented to the XIII World Congress of 
Sociology, International Sociology Association, Bielefeld, Germany, July 13-23, 
July 18-23, 1994.
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needs, their concerns will be subordinated to the struggle of First 
Nations communities for self-determination. To a lesser degree it 
can be argued that this situation has already occurred. As 
Shridhar Sharma states, "the child welfare issue has not been a 
priority amongst the federal Parliamentarians and Indian leaders 
and thus a change in child welfare legislation is long time 
coming.
Possibly the most detrimental character of the Convention is 
the totalizing theory of universality of rights. That First 
Nations children will be treated as if they were equal, and as if 
their lived experiences were the same as any child in Canada 
invalidates the social, economic and political environment in which 
they exist. In effect, universality "disqualifies alternative 
accounts of social reality. Frances Olsen states that "the
quoted in Samuel Bull, "The Special Case of the Native Child," 523. 
with this citation, I do not mean to undermine the efforts of First Nations 
communities to gain control of child service delivery. To be sure, since the 
early 1980s, First Nations connnmities have assiduously worked with the Ccuiadian 
judiciary to wrest control of child welfare services. Beginning with the 
Spallumcheen Band in 1989, two-thirds of b«&nds in Canada have now entered into 
tri-partite agreements between the Band, the provinciêü. and federal governments, 
to assume responsibility of child welfare services. See Sinclair and Bala, 
"Aboriginal Child Welfare Laws," 186-188. Despite the divestment of control. 
First Nations children continue to be caught in jurisdictional disputes, problems 
arising from insufficient funds, transfer of payment and egregious bureaucratic 
reporting procedures. (This is anecdotal evidence from a Child Protection Worker 
ençloyed by the B.C. Ministry of Social Services.)
"'Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law. 4.
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claim of unsituatedness is made by and on behalf of those with 
power. Further, she boldly asserts that "to the extent the 
Convention deals with children as unspecified, unsituated people, 
it tends in fact to deal with white, male, relatively privileged 
c h i l d r e n . I n  essence, these "false universalisms" create a myth 
of rights for First Nations children.
To substantiate the foregoing discussion, I will now point to 
specific Articles and relate them to First Nations children. Cohen 
suggests that "the essence of law exists in its interpretation and 
application" and that the Convention "is written in the language of 
a constitutive instrument, meaning that it is intentionally 
inexplicit and amenable to interpretation.My question is, how 
amenable will the interpretation of the dominant society be to a 
First Nations child?
For example. Article 2 states that a child is entitled to the 
rights set forth in the Convention "without discrimination of any 
kind." The colonial history of First Nations peoples attests to
^^’Frances Olsen, "Children's Rights; Some Feminist Approaches to the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child," International Journal of Law and 
the Family 6 (1992), 195.
^«Olsen, 195.
“ C^ohen, "Rights of the Child," 5.
74
the principle of discrimination based on ethnicity, as discussed in 
chapter two.
Article 3 stipulates that in all actions concerning children,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration --
this is the guiding principle of the Convention. Alston concedes
that there is considerable potential for Article 3 to be invoked in
deference of cultural practices which are compatible with
children's rights norms of the dominant society.As evidence, he
cites a case study of First Nations children which
surveyed the extent to which the principle was 
applied by the Canadian judiciary to present a 
consistent preference in favour of "the 
apprehension and placement of First Nations 
children away from their families smd 
communities as natural, necessary and 
legitimate, rather than coercive and 
destructive.
Wotherspoon and Satzewich also question the "best interest" 
principle :
Ultimately, the move to establish child welfare 
practices "in the best interests of the child" 
continues to leave unanswered questions about who 
is defining and directing those interests, and to 
what end.
"'Alston, "Reconciling the Best Interest of the Child," 21. 
"'Alston, 21.
"«Wotherspoon and Satzewich, First Nations. 94.
75
Article 8 provides the right to preserve a child's identity, 
including nationality, name and family relations. Identity is not 
a simple matter of biological identity or citizenship. To a First 
Nations child it is particularly complex. Are they girls and boys, 
daughters and sons of their biological parents, adoptive daughters 
and sons of grandparents, aunts, uncles or "Houses," Canadian 
citizens, or members of their respective Nations? At birth, they 
are accorded a legislated identity through Status registration 
which does not ensure the protection or the promotion of their 
rights.
Under entitlement to care. Articles 24 (Health), 27 (Standard 
of Living) , 28 (Education) , and so forth are designed to meet 
children's basic needs. Standards of care designed by and for 
European Canadian children continue to marginalize First Nations 
children. Why should they not be so if they are designed to be 
intolerant of difference?
The Canadian government signed the Convention with a 
reservation with respect to adoptions (Article 21). The reservation 
ensures that "customary forms of care" of First Nations communities 
are not restricted by Article 21. While this reservation was a 
form of "protection" sought by First Nations groups during the 
drafting process, the phrase "customary forms of care" is not
76
explicitly defined. This appsurent victory for First Nations might 
prove otherwise in that it leaves the decision to define what is 
customary to the dominant judicial process. On one hand, adopting 
and enforcing customary law accedes to the rights of First Nations 
to identify and govern their own social relations; on the other 
hand, it forces them to rely on legal processes to define what is 
customary for them.“® Codifying customs, as Goonesekere argues, 
may not reflect community traditions; instead, they may become 
products of misinterpretation or imposition of judicial 
perception.^*®
What further complicates the interpretation of customary forms 
of care and, for that matter, First Nations customary laws, is the 
reliance of First Nations on oral histories and oral tradition. The 
dominant courts, relying on written principles, will have 
difficulty establishing practice from oral histories and 
traditions. Moreover, the system of legal precedents precludes the 
understanding and acceptance of "lived relationships" which inform 
First Nations customary laws. Lived relationships refer to the
further discussion, see Jo-Anne Fiske, "The Supreme Law euid the Grand 
Law," BC Studies. 105-16 (1995), 183-199.
«^«Goonesekere, "Women's Rights & Children's Rights," 27.
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moral, emotional, and social relationships that are intrinsic to 
the legal code of obligations in First Nations communities.
Finally, Article 42 states that "States Parties undertake to 
make the principles and provisions of the Convention widely known, 
by appropriate and active means, to adults and children alike." 
However, Teresa Nahanee asserts that "Canada has made no effort to 
inform aboriginal children or their parents on the rights 
guaranteed under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The 
Metis National Council also states that "our Metis citizens have 
not been informed about the Convention or its contents because 
there has not been on-going communication between the federal 
government and the Metis."^ '*® Regrettably, I have yet to find any 
evidence with which to dispute this claim.
While I have examined but several of the fifty four articles, 
the Convention appears to fall short of empowering First Nations 
children, even though the international community may have been 
genuine in its intention. The Convention symbolizes "two distinct 
doctrines of person" - one which requires the construction of a
^^ ''Native Women's Association of Canada, "Aboriginal Children's Rights: 1993 
NWAC Report on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, " June 1993 [photocopy], 
Ottawa, 76.
-'"Metis National Council. "Metis National Council Report on the thiited 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child," June 1993 [photocopy], 2.
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First Nations identity, beyond the exigencies of the State, for 
empowerment of rights; and another which portrays them as children, 
irrespective of their First Nations identity for access to those 
rights. With the Convention, they gain the right to speak for 
themselves. However, as Barry Morris asserts that in the 
construction of their identity, "they lose the right to speak for 
themselves as the production of their identity is invested in 
experts and authorities and are mediated by institutions of the 
state s y s t e m . F a l k  more forcefully states that national 
identity converted to legal status conferred by the state does not 
correspond with their ethnic, psychological and political 
reality.While the Convention creates a new institutional space 
for the "expression of otherness," it also perpetuates an area of 
struggle for First Nations children.
*^*Barry Morris, "The Politics of Identity; From Aborigines to the First 
Australian," in Jeremy Beckett, ed.. Past and Present; The Construction of 
Aboriginalitv (Canberra; Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988), 84.
^“Richard Falk, "The Struggle of Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of 
Natural Political Communities," in Ruth Thompson, ed.. The Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law (Sask; diversity of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 
1987), 60.
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion
I return to the beginning of this study, wherein the central 
question of this analysis was put forth: Is the Convention an 
appropriate and effective instrument to protect and promote the 
rights of First Nations children? I submit that, insofar as the 
Convention recognizes indigenous children as objects of protection, 
it does so clearly. With respect to the empowerment of rights, 
through the protection and promotion of their rights, this analysis 
has suggested that the Convention is am ineffective instrument.
The theory of rights, rooted in the individual pursuit of
life, liberty and property, runs contrary to the essence of First
Nations being. Further, the plurality of legal codes gives rise to
competing rights. As Olsen argues,
[t]he Convention is indeterminate insofar as it 
supports flatly conflicting and contradictory 
rights. Children's rights to care conflicts with 
their right to autonomy, their right to formal 
equality with their right to autonomy, their and 
others' rights to security with their and others'
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right to freedom of action, and their rights 
with the rights of others, especially mothers.
For First Nations children, I would add the right to their 
indigenous identity with their rights as children. For them, the 
Convention represents only a partial interpretation of who they 
are.
Lastly, I reiterate that the universality of rights creates a 
myth of rights for First Nations children. The lack of "subject 
positioning" renders it an inappropriate and ineffective instrument 
to protect and promote their rights.
The historic and material assumptions on which the Convention 
is based do not allow for the inclusion of the lived experiences of 
First Nations children. The introduction of children's rights, 
however noble the intention, closes up a space for alternative 
conceptions of social relations. As Michael King and Christine 
Piper assert in examining the issue of children as bearers of 
rights,
[t]o see social relations in terms of rights is 
all to structure and understand the world in a 
very different way than to evaluate them, for 
example, according to the level of love or 
trust they contain.-®^
®^K)lsen, “Feminist Approaches to Children's Rights," 195.
^^Michael King and Christine Piper, How the Law Thinks about Children 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 69.
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For First Nations children, their social relations are
categorized for them in a manner which devalues who they are. They 
are forever caught in competing discourses, not only in the
attendant conflictual positions posed by positive rights, but in 
their ethnicity. As with class and gender, ethnicity is a factor 
in determing what is best for a child.
Canada's first report to the Commission pertaining to the 
first five years of the implementation of the Convention contained 
some information on the status of First Nations children. This 
would seem to be an indication of Canada's adherence to the
Convention, an attempt to redress the wrongs of the past, and
fulfil its moral obligation among States with respect to Canada's 
children. The Commission responded with further questions regarding 
First Nations children, an indication of the international 
community's concern. Six out of the twenty-nine questions 
pertained to First Nations children. In the end, however, the 
report of the International Committee on the Rights of the Child 
lauded Canada's "general strengthening of the protection of human 
rights, particularly children's rights through the Csuiadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms and through the adoption of legislative
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measures in the field of children's rights."^” This statement was
made in spite of the report's conclusion regarding the state of
Canada's First Nations children:
While recognizing the steps already taken, the 
Committee notes with concern the special problems 
still faced by childen from vulnerable 
and disadvantaged groups, such as aboriginal 
children, with regard to the enjoyment of 
their fundamental rights, including access to 
to housing and education.
The Committee suggested strengthening efforts such that 
aboriginal children may "benefit from positive measures aimed at 
facilitating access to education and housing. Research should be 
developed on the problems with respect to the growing rate of 
infant mortality and suicide among children and aboriginal 
communities.
I suggest that while their intentions are clear, their efforts 
are misguided. The rights of First Nations children are profoundly 
political and intrinsically linked to the current struggle of First 
Nations to self-determination and self government. They cannot be 
extracted from the social, political and legal discourses deployed
“^CRC/C15/Add.37, 2, as excerpted in Samders, "International Human Rights 
Law, Spring 1996," Al-S-1.
^«CRC/ClS/Add.37, 4.
“SCRC/C15/Add.37, 5.
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by both the dominant and First Nations societies. And the extent 
to which their rights are guaranteed, protected and promoted 
depends on the level to which the State interprets Section 35 of 
the Canadian Constitution. In essence, First Nations children's 
mortality rate, literacy level, morbidity rate, child abuse, and so 
forth, depend on the political processes involved in renegotiating 
the past. For First Nations children, the Convention symbolizes a 
domain of political struggle. As the Native Council of Canada 
commented when asked to take part in preparing the State's response 
to the commission, "we appreciate that the Convention is the result 
of a political process ... we have been asked to comment on a 
process that we were not part of, but will most certainly be 
affected by."^ ®*
To close, I support Olsen's assertion that "[t]he Convention 
fails to the extent it fails to challenge the categories through 
which we understand the world. If we continually conceptualize 
and speak of ideas such as the rights of children and ethnicity in
“*The Native Council of Canada. "Report by the Native Council of Canada on 
Canada's response to the ON Conventionon the rights of the Child," 2.
“’Olsen, "Feminist i^proaches to Children's Rights," 195.
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their most limited form in traditional categories, it is highly 
improbable that something as heralded as the Convention will ensure 
the healthy and harmonious development of First Nations children 
for seven generations.
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